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Passive Sidesticks and Hard Landings – Is 
there a Link? 
Floris Wolfert1, Michael A. Bromfield2, Alex Stedmon3 
Institute for Future Transport & Cities, Coventry University, Coventry, CV1 3AT, United 
Kingdom 
Steve Scott4 
Faculty of Engineering & Computing, Coventry University, Coventry, CV1 3AT, United 
Kingdom 
In the period between 2007 and 2017, the number of commercial aircraft equipped with 
passive sidesticks has more than doubled. However, a passive sidestick may limit the ability of 
the Pilot Monitoring to perceive the flight control inputs by the Pilot Flying therefore affecting 
monitoring duties. As part of a research program into Loss of Control In Flight, this paper 
compares accident statistics and reports for hard landings involving jet aircraft fitted with 
conventional coupled control inceptors and passive sidesticks. 
I. Nomenclature 
AAIB  = Air Accidents Investigation Branch 
df  = Degrees of Freedom 
DI  = Dual Input 
FAA  = Federal Aviation Administration 
FO  = First Officer 
FBW  = Fly-By-Wire 
IATA  = International Air Transport Association 
ICAO  = International Civil Aviation Organization 
M  = Mean 
MLG  = Main Landing Gear 
PF  = Pilot Flying 
PM  = Pilot Monitoring 
SD  = Standard Deviation 
STATSUM = Statistical Summary of Commercial Jet Airplane Accidents 
x2  = Chi-squared 
II. Introduction 
All of the commercial Fly-By-Wire aircraft featuring sidesticks have no cross coupling in between the sidesticks. This 
means that if the pilot moves his sidestick the co-pilots sidestick will remain static. This type of sidestick is called a 
‘passive sidestick’. The philosophy of Airbus regarding the independent sidesticks is to avoid the introduction of 
single point failures that could affect both sidesticks [1]. These separate flight control systems also avoid friction, 
backlash and inertia due to their missing mechanical coupling. From a human factors point of view, this missing 
coupling between the sidesticks creates some considerations within a multi-crew flight deck. It limits a monitoring 
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pilot to perceive the flight control inputs from the other pilot. Within a multi-crew flight deck there is the task ‘Pilot 
Flying’ (PF), who flies the aircraft and ‘Pilot Monitoring’ (PM) who actively monitors the flight. The Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) defines the PM tasks as the following: “Monitoring includes the process of observing and 
creating a mental model, by seeking out available information to compare actual and expected aircraft state.” [2]. In 
some situations, effective monitoring can be the last line of defense to prevent accidents from happening. However, 
on a flight deck equipped with passive sidesticks, it is hard to predict an aircraft state when the flight control inputs 
are not directly available for the PM. This study focusses on what the effects of passive sidesticks are on hard landing 
accidents within the commercial jet aviation. The first passive sidestick in commercial aviation was introduced by 
Airbus in 1987 on the Airbus A320 [3] . Since then the passive sidestick has been slowly introduced in the business 
jet aviation, making its first introduction in the Dassault Falcon 7X in 2005. By then Airbus has gained a large share 
in the commercial jet aviation market. In 2007 18% of the worldwide commercial jet aircraft in operation were passive 
sidestick aircraft, all built by Airbus. However, over the last 10 years more and more manufacturers converted to a 
passive sidestick system. In 2017 there are, besides Airbus, 3 other manufacturers that are building commercial jet 
aircraft with passive sidestick flight controls. These manufacturers are Comac, with their C919 aircraft, Bombardier, 
with their C series and Sukhoi, with their 100-Superjet. The total amount of passive sidestick aircraft has increased 
from roughly 4000 aircraft in 2007 to 9130 in 2017 [4]. Passive sidestick aircraft were now responsible for 35% of 
the total commercial jet aircraft worldwide in 2017. The forecast are that these number will only increase. Currently, 
51,6% of all jet aircraft on order are equipped with passive sidesticks [4].  
III. Considerations of the Passive Sidestick System 
Although passive sidesticks are commonly used in commercial aviation, there are some considerations that come 
with the passive sidestick system.  
A. Communication Breakdown 
Due to the increased amount of automation introduced in modern fly-by-wire aircraft, the need to directly link the 
flight control inceptors from the cockpit to the flight control surfaces is gone. Instead of running physical cables from 
the cockpit to the control surfaces, the control surfaces are now electronically driven by the flight computer, which is 
electronically driven by the control inceptors. This situation requires less physical components, saves weight, allows 
for a more reliable system [1] and generates a more simplified system architecture. However, with the deletion of 
these flight control linkages, the cross-coupling between the two inceptors has been removed as well. It is suggested 
by several authors that the deletion of this physical interconnection removes one of the lines in which pilots 
communicate [5, 6]. Field & Harris described in their research the four channels in which pilots communicate with 
each other, the aircraft and the environment. They described that pilots perceive information from each other 
throughout auditory cues, peripheral visual cues and proprioceptive cues. Proprioception is defined as: “the sense of 
relative position of one’s body parts and the strength of effort being employed in this movement” [7]. The deletion of 
the interconnection between the control inceptors removes the proprioceptive cues for the PM. Proprioceptive cueing 
is used for a pilot to perceive and feel flight control movements. Field & Harris illustrated these four communication 
channels in figure 1. This paper stated that cues perceived by the peripheral view are still a way in which pilots 
communicate. However, in terms of passive flight control inceptors, this is nearly impossible. The position of the 
passive inceptors is on the outboard side of the cockpit making the other inceptor difficult to perceive throughout the 
peripheral view. In relation to yokes and center-stick flight inceptors who’s movements are much more easily captured 
due to the simple fact that these movements occur within the peripheral view. Next to that, the deflection of these 
passive inceptors is much smaller in comparison to yokes and center-sticks, making their movement even harder to 
perceive. For these reasons, Field & Harris concluded that the pilot of passive sidestick aircraft is much more 
depending on cues throughout the central vision and auditory cues in comparison to conventional flight controlled 
aircraft. According to Mica Endsley, this type of situation can lead to a decreased level of situation awareness. 
Situation awareness can be described as: “the perception of environmental elements, the comprehension of their 
meaning and the projection of their future state” [8]. In an earlier paper, Endsley concluded that the utilization of 
several sensory modalities for conveying information enhances situation awareness [9]. If that is true, then the opposite 
can be concluded as well: The removal of several sensory modalities can lead to a decreased situation awareness. 
Therefore the removal of two communication channels between pilots can lead to a decreased situation awareness. 
The removal of these communication lines leads pilots in more heavily depending on visual and auditory cues, which 
are already extensively used when flying a modern aircraft. Again, according to Endsley, this is the opposite of 
enhancing situation awareness, stating that overburdening one sensory channel is not desirable for designing situation 
awareness [9].  
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Fig. 1  Information transfer between the airplane and flight crew, adapted from [10]  
B. Dual Input Logic 
The passiveness of the sidestick enables the possibility of a ‘DUAL INPUT’ (DI). A DI occurs when both pilots 
are using the sidestick at the same time. The current way that all passive sidestick aircraft deal with this is by 
algebraically sum up both inputs. Generating a signal output with a maximum of a single stick deflection. For example, 
if both of the pilots push the sidestick halfway forward, the output will be equivalent as a full forwarded stick 
deflection. This is also true for conflicting commands. If one pilot pushes the stick fully forwards and the other pilot 
pulls the stick fully back, the resulting command is zero. The issue with this system logic is that the summation of the 
inputs generates a flight control deflection that none of the pilots want. There is an aural cue in order to notify the 
pilots that a dual input is occurring. Whenever a dual input is occurring an aural warning sounds saying: ‘DUAL 
INPUT’. However, this aural warning can be muted when a higher precedence warning is sounding such as: ‘SINK 
RATE’ or ‘PULL UP’, as has been the case in the Air Afriqiyah accident in Tripoli [11]. Research by Dehais [12] 
concluded that in many situations pilots are susceptible to unintentional deafness in high stress situations in the 
cockpit. According to Uehara [10], dual inputs in Fly-By-Wire aircraft often occur after a sudden evolution of a 
situation leading to manual input corrections. In order to avoid a dual input situation, every passive sidestick aircraft 
is equipped with a ‘Priority Take-over Push Button’ located on each sidestick. When this button is pressed, the other 
sidestick’s control inputs are canceled out. According to ICAO Annex 2 [13], the commander should always be in 
command stating: “The pilot-in-command of an aircraft shall have final authority as to the disposition of the aircraft 
while in command”. Therefore, if both pilots push the Priority take-over button, the captains’ side will overrule. If a 
pilot presses the Priority Take-over button an aural alarm sounds, together with an illuminating light. A summary of 
these warnings can be seen in Figure 2. As mentioned by Uehara, dual inputs often occur when a sudden situation 
occurs. The question is, how instinctive is the priority push button when the other pilot wants to take control? 
According to some accident reports, the priority switch button is not instinctive at all [14,15]. The AAIB concluded 
several times that in certain situations in which the PM is forced to suddenly intervene, pressing the priority push 
button is not instinctive. It is much more instinctive in these situations to move the sidestick. In these types of 
situations, a dual input occurs, in which the output of the flight controls is a summation of the inputs, in many instances 
results in a combined output that none of the pilots initiated. Other than that, the AAIB conclude that the take-over 
push button is a highly cognitive action, instead of instinctive [15]. 
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Fig. 2 Sidestick Priority Logic adapted from [16] 
C. Unlinked Flight Controls on Flying Skill development 
As stated above, the removal of the cross-coupling between the control inceptors also removed one of the lines in 
which pilots communicate. Research by Rees & Harris concluded that the physical linkage between the control 
inceptors also functions as a way to develop flying skills [17]. In this study, 20 ab-initio pilots flew a series of 
approaches in linked and unlinked flight control inceptor configuration. The results suggest that unlinked control 
inceptors are affecting the development of psychomotor control skills. Throughout proprioceptive cues, the ab-initio 
pilot gets a better feeling on how to fly an approach, simply by feeling the cues from the flight instructor. This missing 
learning channel might also be affecting currency levels of passive sidestick pilots. Research done by Haslbeck & 
Hoerman [18] showed a difference in manual flying skill degradation between long-haul pilots and short-haul pilots. 
They concluded that the difference lies in the lack of practice of long-haul pilots, who only are only conducting a few 
flights a month. If the limited amount of flying degrades the psychomotor skills from long-haul pilots, the lack of 
proprioceptive cuing for passive sidestick pilots could perhaps do the same thing.  
IV. Methodology 
A. Hard Landing definition 
To develop a common understanding of hard landings, the following definition is introduced: A hard landing is 
defined as: ‘a symmetrical and conventional landing or de-rotation with hard contact to the ground that resulted in 
damage to the aircraft’. Commercial aircraft are equipped with flight data recorders that are capable of measuring 
vertical acceleration. However, there are several inaccuracies regarding the accelerometer hence the reason why 
acceleration exceedance is not used for the hard landing definition in this research. First of all, accelerometers are 
used to measure in-flight accelerations and are therefore not positioned in a suitable place in the aircraft for measuring 
landing accelerations. Because of the position, the inaccuracies of the accelerometer can lead up to 0.4g during landing 
[19]. Secondly, the accelerations vary in magnitude and acceleration. Since the average accelerometer captures data 
16 times per second, it is impossible to determine if the recorded value is the actual maximum, minimum or some 
intermediate value [20]. Finally, within this research different aircraft make and models are compared, every make 
and model differs in maximum allowed landing acceleration. According to [19], the best way to determine a hard 
landing is to calculate the true vertical speed, which can be derived from flight data parameters. However, the majority 
of accident reports do not provide sufficient data to make this calculation and can therefore not be carried out. In order 
to define a hard landing, damage will be leading in the definition. So any landing that was hard to an extent that it 
resulted in damage, will be considered a hard landing. 
B. Accident Data 
This study was carried out on air accident reports of hard landings of registered Air Accident Investigation 
Authorities by ICAO within the last 11 years (2007 – 2017). The data set is derived from online sources. According 
to ICAO, there are 204 different air safety authorities. Out of these 204, there have been 119 authorities with an 
accessible website. Out of these 119 authorities, 72 published reports on their website. A total of 107 accident reports 
were obtained which fitted the pre-determined hard landing definition. In order to make a reliable comparison, some 
reports will be excluded from this study. First of all, turboprop aircraft will not be included in this study. Currently, 
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there are no turboprop aircraft within commercial aviation equipped with passive sidesticks. Secondly, hard landings 
that occurred due to contributing weather will not be taken into account. Examples of these are wind shear, microbursts 
or sudden turbulence drops. Thirdly, hard landings that occurred due to mechanical failures will also be excluded. 
Examples of these are flight control malfunctions, autopilot malfunctions, runaway trim/elevators or erroneous flight 
instrumentation. Finally, hard landings that occurred during high workload situations are also excluded. Examples of 
these are engine inoperative, damage due to bird-strikes or landing gear failures. When taking these factors in account, 
there are 44 accident reports left for this study of which 23 occurred on conventional flight control aircraft and 21 
occurred on passive sidestick aircraft. All of these accidents occurred in relatively good weather, and all have a human 
error component in common. A summary of all these reports can be found in Appendix I. 
To compare the accident reports database, a cross-reference is being used. The Boeing Statistical Summary of 
Commercial Jet Airplane Accidents (STATSUM) shows an annual overview of the accidents within commercial jet 
aviation. Within the past 10 years, the Boeing accident statistics are showing 39 hard landing accidents that resulted 
in damage. These statistics are only mentioning the aircraft type, operator and a small summary, therefore extensive 
research on this database is not possible. However, the Boeing Accident Statistics is inconsistent with the accident 
reports acquired from the accident investigating authorities. The data gathered from air accident reports showed 28 
accidents that are not mentioned in the Boeing STATSUM. The other way around, the Boeing STATSUM is 
mentioning 18 accidents that are not found in the accident reports. Out of these 18 accidents, no additional reports 
were accessible.  
V. Results 
A. Difference in Pilot Experience 
Out of the 44 accident reports, 39 reports mentioned the amount of hours flight-experience of the pilot flying on 
aircraft type. An independent t-test was conducted to compare the flight experience of the pilot flying on passive 
sidestick aircraft and conventional flight controlled aircraft. There was a significant difference in experience for pilots 
whom suffered hard landings a with passive sidestick aircraft (M = 993.00, SD = 989.90) and pilots whom suffered a 
hard landing with conventional flight controlled aircraft (M = 2814.33, SD = 3232.36); t = -2.45, p = 0.02, (two-
tailed). The magnitude of the difference in the means is large (eta-squared =0.76). This difference in experience 
becomes more evident if the data is capped at 300 flight hours on type (Fig. 3). In 44% of the hard landings cases that 
occurred with passive sidestick aircraft happened with pilots with less than 300 hours experience on type. For 
conventional flight controlled aircraft, this is only 19%. A chi-square test for independence (Yates’ Continuity 
Correction) indicated no significant difference between the two groups with less than 300 hours on type χ2 (1 df) = 
0.81, p=0.17.  
Another finding is that out of the 20 accidents with passive sidestick aircraft, 4 of these (20%) occurred during an 
instruction flight or line training flight. This means that in 28% of the cases there was a valid flight instructor on the 
flight deck and a 3rd safety pilot present in the cockpit. For the conventional flight control aircraft this was only 1 case.  
 
Fig. 3  Hard landings and experience breakdown  
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B. Passive Sidestick System Logic Contribution 
Out of the 20 hard landings with passive sidestick aircraft, 12 reports mentioned the passive sidestick system that 
may have contributed to the hard landing. In 38% of the passive sidestick hard landings a ‘DUAL INPUT’ occurred, 
which in many cases worsened the situation. In 8 cases (40%) of the hard landings, either the accident investigation 
authority or the PM stated the inability for the PM to perceive flight control inputs from the pilot flying. In 4 cases 
(20%) the investigating authority mentioned the instinctiveness of the priority take over push button to some extent 
contributing to the hard landing. As mentioned previously, these factors are caused by the way the system is designed. 
In a coupled flight control environment none of these factors are relevant.  
C. Unstable approaches 
The current literature pointed out that half of the hard landings in commercial jet aviation are the result of an 
unstable approach [20,21]. Every report out of the 44 available reports mentioned the approach being either stabilized 
or unstable. The overall dataset showed that 50% of the accidents followed an unstable approach. However, it is not 
evenly distributed among passive sidestick and conventional aircraft. For the conventional aircraft, 79% of the hard 
landings are considered to be unstable approaches. For passive sidestick aircraft, this number is 19%. This means that 
81% of the passive sidestick hard landings are stable approaches but mainly wrongly initiated flare maneuvers (Fig 
4). A chi-square test for independence (with Yates’ Continuity Correction) indicated a significant difference between 
the two groups χ2 (1 df) = 13.294, p=0.00, phi= 0.59. According to Cohen [22] the phi coefficient value of 0.59 is 
considered to be large. This means the magnitude of the significance is large. This indicates there is a significant 
difference between the amount of stable and unstable approaches between the two groups.  
  
Fig. 4  Hard Landings and stabilized approaches        
D. Other results 
Several parameters been taken into account that did not show any significance or correlation. Firstly, the different 
types of flight controls were compared to the normal acceleration of their hard landing. This is data is measured in 
normal acceleration taken from the accident reports if mentioned. However, there has been no significant difference 
between the two types in terms of severity of the hard landing. Secondly, the majority of the air accident reports 
classified the damage of the hard landing. There is no significant difference between the two aircraft types in terms of 
damage classification.  
E. Daytime or Night-time conditions 
According to several studies, pilots are more vulnerable to make errors during daytime operation in comparison to 
night-time operations. De Mello [23] investigated the different times to which pilots are likely to make a mistake in 
airline operations. His conclusion is that pilots are the most vulnerable to mistakes during the early morning and 
afternoon. Concluding that the risk of encountering an error in early morning operations is the highest. Similar results 
of Shapell [24] shows that the majority of  air transport accidents take place during VMC conditions in daylight 
conditions. The results of the accident reports are in line with these results. There have been 32 hard landing accidents 
(76%) that took place during daylight conditions, and 8 hard landing accidents (19%) during the night and 2 accidents 
during meteorological twilight (4%). These results tend to be in line with the results of Shappel, who concluded 
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respectively 70% of the accident occurred during daytime conditions, 25% during night conditions and 5% during 
meteorological twilight [24]. 
F. Single-aisle aircraft  
No distinction has been made in this dataset towards the difference between wide-body aircraft and single aisle 
aircraft between the two groups. Unexperienced pilots usually fly smaller aircraft and once they gained more 
experience they tend to fly bigger aircraft. In order to make this distinction the difference is also made between the 
two groups solely on single0aisle aircraft, to see if the experience levels still differ. However, if the dataset is filtered 
on single-aisle aircraft only, all the results remain significant. First of all, the flight cycle comparison stays significant 
with a Chi-square (with Yates’ Continuity Correction) χ2 (1 df) = 0.94, p=0.2. Secondly, the difference in experience 
between conventional (M = 2974.33, SD = 3607.27) and passive sidestick (M = 849.50, SD = 880.02) remains 
significant: t = -2.21, p = 0.41, (two-tailed). The effect size for this significance resulted in an eta squared of 0.81, 
which means a large magnitude of significance. If the amount of flight hours is capped at 300 it still shows no 
significance: χ2 (1 df) = 0.41, p=0.11. The differences in stabilized and unstable approaches remain significant for 
single-aisle comparison χ2= 19.95, p=0.00 phi=0.83) also with a large effect size suggesting a large magnitude of 
significance. There have been insufficient hard landing accidents with wide-body aircraft to do an accurate 
significance testing on wide-body aircraft. 
VI. Discussion 
This study investigated the differences in hard landing accidents between passive sidestick aircraft and aircraft 
fitted with coupled flight controls. First of all, there is a significant difference in the experience of the pilot flying 
between the two aircraft types. Pilots of passive sidestick aircraft are significantly less experienced when they 
encounter a hard landing. This could have several reasons. The main reason for this difference in experience could be 
the inability for the PM to perceive the flight control inputs. This could be the case since 20% of the hard landing 
accidents with passive sidesticks occurred during a line training flight with a flight instructor as PM. This in 
combination with a PF with limited experience suggests that it could be more difficult to detect or intervene a hard 
landing for the PM on a passive sidestick aircraft. As the current literature pointed out [17], it is more difficult to learn 
to fly without linked controls. In the light of these results, it could mean that inexperienced pilots could also have 
more difficulties learning how to land on a passive sidestick aircraft. This in combination with a flight instructor that 
cannot effectively monitor the flight control inputs can be the main reason for the experience difference between the 
two aircraft types. Another key result from this study is the significant difference in the number of unstable approaches. 
According to [20, 21] half of the hard landings that occur are the result of an unstable approach. Within the dataset 
this is clearly the case. In 50% of the cases, the hard landing was a result of an unstable approach. More interesting is 
the breakdown between the two different aircraft types. For passive sidestick aircraft only 19% of the hard landings 
were unstable approaches. This means that 81% of the hard landings that occurred with passive sidestick aircraft are 
stable approaches but the initialization of the flare was incorrect. This effect can be explained by the relatively large 
amount of inexperienced pilots who might encounter difficulties in the flare maneuver. Another reason could be that 
the passive sidestick aircraft that occurred within the dataset are designed to change flight control laws at a radio 
altitude of 50ft. This changeover from normal flight law to direct flight law might introduce some human factor issues 
for inexperienced pilots. The results from this study, based on air accident reports, tend to be in line with the current 
literature [5, 10, 15, 16]. It is recommended that these scenarios should be experimentally tested, to gather further 
research data to evaluate the effects of passive sidesticks by considering complex human factors.  
  
8 
 
Appendix I Summary of Collected Air Accident Reports 
Date Aircraft 
type 
Registration Summary 
21-02-2007 B737-300 PK-KKV The aircraft touched down hard at Juanda Airport, Indonesia, which resulted 
substantial damage to the fuselage, wheel wells and landing gears 
28-05-2007 A320-200 C-FNVV During a landing at Los Angeles Airport, United States, the aircraft bounced and 
touched down hard with a recorded 3.07g normal acceleration resulting in a 
damaged landing gear. 
05-07-2007 A320-200 G-DHJZ The aircraft landed heavily on Runway 32 at Kos Airport, Greece, causing 
substantial damage to the aircraft’s main landing gear.  It touched down with a 
high rate of descent, following a late initiation of the flare by the co-pilot, who 
was undergoing line training 
31-08-2007 A340-400 EC-JFX The aircraft touched down hard at Quito airport, Ecuador with a drift angle of 7º 
resulting in damage to the undercarriage. 
01-11-2007 B737-200 PK-RIL The aircraft landed on runway 35 at Malang airport, Indonesia. The aircraft 
bounced twice after the initial severe hard landing resulting in substantial damage 
to the landing gear. 
16-12-2007 Bombardier 
CL600 
N470ZW During the approach at TFGS Airport, Rhode Island, United States, the FO 
misunderstood a statement by the captain and reduced power to idle. The aircraft 
developed a high sink rate and during the flare stalled, impacting the runway at a 
high vertical rate. 
08-01-2008 A321-200 F-GUAA The aircraft touched down hard at Algiers Airport, Algeria following a bounced 
landing resulting in a 3.3g acceleration resulting in substantial damage to the 
landing gear struts. 
07-02-2008 B717-200 VH-NXE The aircraft sustained a hard landing at Darwin Airport, Australia, resulting in 
structural damage to the fuselage 
18-07-2008 A321-200 G-DHDJ During a landing at Manchester Airport, United Kingdom, the aircraft was not 
flared sufficiently and a hard landing occurred resulting in a crack in a wing rib 
gear support lug. 
28-07-2008 A321-200 G-MARA The aircraft made a hard landing in a flat attitude at Manchester Airport, United 
Kingdom, in which the nose landing gear sustained internal damage. 
23-03-2009 MD-11F N526FE As result of a hard landing, the aircraft bounced repeatedly on Runway 34L at 
Narita International Airport, Japan. During the course of bouncing, its left wing 
broke and separated from the fuselage, the aircraft caught fire. 
20-04-2009 767-300 CN-RNT The aircraft touched down at New York Airport, United States, with a normal 
acceleration consistent with a “firm” landing.  As the main gear touched down, a 
full nose down column was applied that produced a very high nose-down pitch 
rate, which resulted in a hard nose gear touchdown resulting in substantial 
damage to the fuselage and nose gear 
06-05-2009 DC-10-30 N139WA The aircraft experienced a hard landing on runway 10 at Baltimore/Washington, 
United States resulting in damage to the nose landing gear and wheels 
04-08-2009 A320-200 CS-TKO The aircraft experienced a very hard landing on Ponta Delgada's runway 30, 
Portugal, causing substantial damage to both main landing gears. 
24-05-2010 Embraer 
ERJ-145 
F-GUBF The aircraft landed hard on to Ljubljana Airport, Slovenia, resulting in a 
deformed main landing gear shock absorber.  
27-07-2010 MD-11F D-ALCQ During the landing phase on runway 33Left in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, the aircraft 
bounced during the initial firm landing, which was followed by two hard 
landings.  The aft fuselage ruptured and the aircraft eventually stopped on the 
side on the runway. 
03-10-2010 B767-300 G-OOBK The aircraft landed heavily on Runway 09 at Bristol Airport, United Kingdom.  
The de-rotation was rapid and damage occurred as a result of the force with which 
the nose landing gear met the runway. 
12-12-2010 B777-200 F-GSPI After touchdown of the main landing gear, the captain pushed the nose down 
firmly, the nose wheel bounced hard several times without dampening resulting 
in a damage nose wheel gear. 
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13-04-2011 A330-200 G-GZCB The aircraft touched down hard at Caracas Airport, Venezuela resulting in a 
damaged landing gear strut. 
30-07-2011 Bombardier 
CL-600 
EC-ITU The aircraft touched down hard with the nose and main landing gear on Barcelona 
Airport, Spain, resulting in substantial damage to the landing gear. 
22-07-2011 B737-300 PK-GGO The aircraft touched down on runway 17 of Malang Airport, Indonesia, resulting 
in substantial damage to the engines and landing gear.  
26-09-2011 DC-95 YV136T The aircraft made a hard touch down at Puerto Ordaz causing both engines' 
(JT8D) pylons and support structures at the airframe to crack. 
14-02-2012 A319-111 G-EZFV The aircraft made firm contact with the runway of London Luton Airport, United 
Kingdom. The normal acceleration recorded at touchdown was 2.99g, which is 
classified as a Severe Hard Landing and resulted in a gear replacement. 
20-06-2012 767-300 JA610A The aircraft experienced a bounce when attempting to land at Runway 16R of 
Narita International Airport and had a damage to the fuselage and gears. 
29-08-2012 A320-200 EC-KDG The aircraft produced a hard landing on Berlin Tegel Airport's runway 26R 
(Germany) and bounced with the tail contacting the runway resulting in 
substantial damage to the gear and tail section. 
10-04-2013 A320-200 G-OZBY During rejected go around on Prestwick airport, United Kingdom, the aircraft de-
rotated rapidly resulting in substantial damage to the nose gear. 
20-05-2013 A320-200 UR-WUB The aircraft touched down hard at Kiev Airport, Ukraine, with a high pitch, 
resulting is damage to the landing gear and tail section. 
25-10-2013 Bombardier 
CL-600 
EC-JYA The aircraft landed hard at San Sebastian Airport, Spain, resulting in a damage 
landing gear. 
16-01-2014 A320-200 EI-EZV The aircraft landed hard with a normal acceleration of 2.75g on London 
Heathrow, United Kingdom, resulting in 4 minor injured crewmembers, damage 
is not reported. 
01-02-2014 B737-900 PK-LFH The aircraft landed hard at Surabaya Airport, Indonesia, resulting in a broken 
wheel hub. 
22-02-2014 B737-800 OK-TVT The aircraft sustained damage during a hard landing in gusting winds at Teicera 
Airport, Portugal. The aircraft suffered substantial damage to the landing gear. 
01-10-2014 Embraer 
190 
PH-EZV The aircraft touched down hard at Schiphol Airport, The Netherlands, due to a 
wrongly set autopilot mode. The aircraft suffered substantial damage to the nose 
landing gear. 
10-05-2014 A319 C-FZUG The aircraft touched down hard on Montego Bay airport, Jamaica, exceeding the 
design criteria of the landing gear resulting in a gear replacement. 
24-11-2014 747-800F LX-VCC The aircraft landed in Libreville, Gabon but touched down hard resulting in 
substantial damage to the landing gear and fuselage. 
15-02-2015 A321-200 VT-PPD The aircraft bounced during landing on Mumbai Airport, India and subsequently 
made a hard landing during the second touchdown resulting in damaged landing 
gear shock absorbers 
14-03-2015 A330-300 9M-MTA The aircraft experienced a hard landing on Melbourne Airport, Australia, of a 
magnitude requiring replacement of the aircraft’s main landing gear. 
25-04-2015 A320-200 TC-JPE The aircraft landed hard on Istanbul Airport, Turkey causing damage to the right 
hand main gear and engine, the crew conducted a go around and during landed 
the right main gear collapsed. 
14-07-2015 A320-200 VT-IEO The aircraft was involved in hard landing incident during landing at NSCBI 
Airport, India, with a normal acceleration of 3.12g, resulting in a change of 
landing gear. 
22-11-2015 B737-300 EX-37005 The aircraft touched down hard at Osh Airport, Kyrgyzstan, causing all gear to 
collapse and separate. 
16-07-2016 A321-200 D-ASTP The aircraft landed hard on Fuerteventura Airport, Spain, which resulted in 
substantial damage to the landing gear.  
13-09-2016 737-300F PK-YSY The aircraft landed hard on Wamena Airport, Indonesia, resulting in the 
separation of both main landing gears 
03-07-2017 A320-200 G-EZAW The aircraft landed hard at Munich Airport, Germany, resulting in a damaged 
nose gear and left main landing gear. 
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18-09-2017 Embraer-
145 
XY-ALE The aircraft encountered hard landing while landing to runway-11 of Sittwe 
Airport, Myanmar, resulting in substantial damage to the wings and landing gears 
01-12-2017 A320-200 SX-ORG The aircraft suffered a severe hard landing at Pristina airport, Kosovo, resulting 
in a gear replacement. 
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